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NOT SO FUN CITY
William Casari

When the handsome and charismatic John Lindsay is elected mayor of New
York in 1966, he inherits a city whose residents still see hope for positive change despite the tumult of a notorious decade and gnawing ﬁscal problems. On his ﬁrst day
as mayor, the Transport Workers Union (TWU) goes on strike against New York
City Transit and shuts down bus and subway service. In response the mayor walks
from his hotel room to City Hall and remarks “it’s still a fun city.” The “fun city”
line becomes the catch phrase of his term (The Fun City). Up in the Bronx, which
Lindsay had visited during his campaign, things are changing. Many white-ethnic
Irish and Jewish families are leaving the borough; their Puerto Rican and AfricanAmerican replacements tend to have a lower educational and socioeconomic level
than their recently departed neighbors. The Bronx continues to grow as a broad
multi-racial working class area and the Grand Concourse, a higher income area
until about 1963, sees its ﬁrst black resident move into a Concourse apartment in the
mid-1960s. At the same time, speciﬁc blocks in the South Bronx are showing signs
of strain, though the picture isn’t yet crystal clear. Race and ethnicity aren’t too far
from anyone’s mind in New York City at the time, in the two years before Martin
Luther King is assassinated.
The social fabric of certain neighborhoods is fraying with a rise in street crime
and drug use coupled with population and economic shifts that result in vacated
apartments and eventually, abandoned buildings. However, as late as 1971 most of
the Bronx is physically intact. The worst is yet to come and will be a result of strategies the city implements based on faulty data supplied by the ﬁre department to
unquestioning consultants; a massive out-migration of Bronxites; and other factors
resulting from the early 1970s urban swirl. By 1977, during Mayor Abe Beame’s
administration, the South Bronx is known worldwide as a desolate, burned-out
wasteland, site of the worst non-war-related urban carnage any inner-city neighborhood has ever known.
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Sound like a ﬁctional TV drama or a fantasy version of the computer game
Sim City? Sadly, it’s exactly what happened, as detailed in two books that go in
depth “sounding the alarm” about why so many buildings and lives were destroyed
in the Bronx as a result of ﬁres. How did this happen to an area that had been a
secure and stable neighborhood just a few years earlier? What really caused the
ﬁres in the South Bronx and what role did the city and its consultants play in the
devastation?
In 2007, I was ﬁnishing my master’s thesis, Concourse Dreams: A Bronx
Neighborhood and Its Future, and my friend J.J. Brennan—an amateur Bronx historian—asked if I was including anything from a book called A Plague on Your
Houses about the housing abandonment and subsequent ﬁres that had consumed
large swaths of the South Bronx. I had never heard of the book and immediately
began reading about the connection between new ﬁre alarm call boxes that actually
resulted in less manpower responding to ﬁres; a consulting ﬁrm called RAND that
recommended closing/combining ﬁres companies where they were needed most;
and the connection between ﬁres and contagious disease. My interest was piqued
about the origin and spread of these destructive ﬁres, of which only seven percent
were attributed to arson. It was a missing chapter from my thesis.
I also read Joe Flood’s The Fires, which details the rise of citywide Fire
Commissioner John O’Hagan, who presided over the worst of the 1970s ﬁres, a period known as “the wars” in FDNY lore. When Lindsay was elected mayor, O’Hagan,
“who strongly believed in the use of statistics and systems analysis to organize the
department, became one of his leading allies” (The Fires). Lindsay also sought the
advice of the RAND Corporation (a contraction of the words research and development) and “on the surface it was a perfect alliance as RAND needed new clients,
Lindsay needed a blueprint for rational government and O’Hagan needed support
for his ideas for making ﬁreﬁghting a scientiﬁc discipline” (The Fires). It turned out
to be a disastrous combination for poor and minority neighborhoods in New York,
especially the South Bronx, already redlined by banks and left to fend for itself by
the City of New York. Reading both books gives the reader a new understanding
that many of the ﬁres that consumed the Bronx south of Fordham Road could have
been contained better, and—even more shockingly—that in some ways the city was
a silent partner in the area’s destruction, wanting to clear land for more appropriate
uses. In presenting these two books along with other related sources I intend to
explain the role of Housing Commissioner Roger Starr, an advocate for planned
shrinkage in declining neighborhoods, and show how media portrayals often created, then perpetuated, stereotypes about the residents and the area. The authors of
the following book, no strangers to numbers as trained epidemiological researchers,
add up the data to create a social analysis of what happened.
A PLAGUE ON YOUR HOUSES
A Plague on Your Houses: How New York Was Burned Down and National
Public Health Crumbled, by Deborah Wallace and Rodrick Wallace, “is a scorching
indictment of the decision to close ﬁre companies in New York in the 1970’s and
a frightening study of the way misguided and malevolent social policy can spark
a chain reaction of enormous and unforeseen urban collapse.” (Wallace). The authors outline how the destruction of neighborhoods through abandonment and ﬁres
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eventually led to the spread of crime and disease not only in those neighborhoods
but in the entire greater New York metropolitan area. The authors and reviewers also
cite the social policy of “planned shrinkage” advocated by Housing Commissioner
Roger Starr. While Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan advocated for “benign neglect” of neighborhoods that were suﬀering, Starr went even farther pushing for
policies that would accelerate the demise of built environments so the land could
be cleared for other light-industrial uses like the Hunts Point Food Market (which
today brings 60,000 truck trips a week through the area). In Plagues, the Wallace’s
devote an entire chapter to “benign neglect” and “planned shrinkage,” linking those
policies to the destruction of neighborhoods like the South Bronx where waves of
conventional and arson ﬁres followed.
In reviewing the book for the Journal of Public Health Policy, David Rosner
writes that this thoughtful book integrates both a technical quantitative analysis
with a profound social analysis of the “ways that the urban market for land, the
capitalist use of space, and the social relations of class all conspire to undermine the
health of the rich and poor alike.” (114). Taking a look at the South Bronx during
the time period of 1974-1977 shows there was an “epidemic” of ﬁres clustered in
place and time. Thus there was a slow destruction of the community that resulted
in out-migration (116). Loss of housing and homelessness were the most obvious
manifestations, along with a swelling of welfare clients burned out of their homes
and then re-housed in places like the Concourse Plaza Hotel near Yankee Stadium,
which since 1923 had been a social gathering place for weddings, bar mitzvahs,
Rotary meetings and an “apartment hotel” for Yankee ballplayers during the season.
The eight-building Noonan Plaza Apartments in Highbridge, considered an Art
Deco showplace by architectural historians and an address of distinction, was also
used to house displaced people. As the City of New York began to move the newly
homeless in, both of these properties began deteriorating causing longtime tenants
and residents to move out as the quickly changing demographics reinforced racial
and social fears during the Lindsay administration in the late 1960s. Disintegration
of the social fabric in many neighborhoods was accompanied by the physical destruction of apartment buildings, a process that had begun in the mid-1950s as the
Bronx began to change racially and post-war demographics shifted as children who
had grown up in the area rejected the world of their parents and began to move
to Westchester, Long Island and the newly opened Co-op City, a massive housing
development near Pelham Bay Park in the Bronx.
The Wallace’s ﬁrst published their ﬁndings in academic journals and were
written oﬀ by RAND as “leftist ideologues with an axe to grind” (Flood 208). The
Wallace team was accusing RAND and the Lindsay administration of a malicious
attempt to burn down poor neighborhoods. While some felt the Wallace’s political
claims were baseless, their technical criticisms of the models, which RAND largely
ignored, were correct (209).
THE FIRES
Brown University Urban Studies Professor Samuel Zipp wrote a book review
in The Nation about Joe Flood’s 2010 book. In The Fires: How a Computer Formula,
Big Ideas, and the Best of Intentions Burned Down New York City, Flood explains how
New York City Mayor John Lindsay hired consultants from the RAND Corporation
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to help modernize municipal service delivery. Applying their formulas and number
crunching to the ﬁre department—and relying heavily on faulty, self-serving, inaccurate information supplied by the Fire Department—the RAND “whiz kids” recommended an overhaul of ﬁre station locations and the number of engines responding to ﬁres, based on ﬂawed ﬁreﬁghter response time data (Zipp 39). These decisions
would have tragic consequences. The city instituted service cuts and reallocations
that created dangerously unprotected spots in the South Bronx like Charlotte Street,
East New York in Brooklyn and the Lower East Side in Manhattan—all poor, minority neighborhoods ravaged by housing abandonment. “Mayor Lindsay’s experiment in systems analysis, Flood says, ‘burned down New York City.’” (39).
When interviewed about his book, Flood tells Marc Ambinder the following
about “what happens when politicians paint by the numbers:”
According to the models, they [New York City] could close busy
ﬁre companies in ﬁre-prone areas without much impact on overall service. For the city, that meant saving money, focusing budget cuts in
politically weak areas and supposedly not losing much ﬁre protection.
That was exactly what everyone wanted to hear, and they ran with it. It
just happened to be wrong.
Flood details John O’Hagan’s rise to Chief of the Fire Department and how
his philosophy ﬁt in perfectly with Mayor Lindsay’s desire to try and bring control
to the city using models and numbers.
Both Fires and Plagues prominently cite Roger Starr, Mayor Beame’s
Commissioner of Housing Preservation and Development and former RAND employee, as a central character in this drama. In an article Starr authored for the New
York Times titled “Making New York Smaller” he argues for reducing the footprint
of city services in grim economic and ﬁscal times. Granted the ﬁscal crisis during
this time was severe and the city needed new sources of revenue that didn’t involve
new taxes or help from Washington, but what he writes near the beginning of the
article is telling: “we could simply accept the fact that the city’s population is going
to shrink, and we could cut back on city services accordingly, realizing considerable
savings in the process” (Starr). Of course this begs the question of what neighborhoods were targeted for a reduction in city services and how were they chosen. Were
these the areas that were already seen to be in decline or had quickly-changing
demographics? Many people were leaving the Bronx because of unsafe conditions
brought on by housing abandonment and ﬁres that were themselves a result of reduction in ﬁre services and the social breakdown of neighborhoods. Yet, there was
actually a need for new housing at the time apartments in the Bronx were burning
down.
In another startling sentence Starr gives up on the American Dream altogether: “essentially planned shrinkage is a recognition that the golden door to full
participation in American life and the American economy is no longer to be found
in New York” (Starr). The reader is left to wonder if Starr and his generation were
the “last pioneers” to participate in the dream of urban America and now the huddled masses will have to look elsewhere. Readers may also question why Starr invests
no intellectual capital answering the very questions he poses; the ﬁnal solution is
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accelerated shrinkage of the South Bronx in order to clear the land. The solution is
presented by Starr with no alternative discussion or questions.
The article authored by Starr is just one example of how media portrayals were
used to stereotype neighborhoods and advocate for their demise from downtown
city planners and consultants. The media are often mentioned as another culprit in
the demise of the South Bronx because local newspapers and national magazines
like Newsweek highlighted housing abandonment and incited racial fear, well before
the major ﬁres consumed neighborhoods. Was the media simply reporting what was
happening, or was it fanning the ﬂames, so to speak? Did the conversation move to
a more serious level after people read major articles in the New York Times and other
leading periodicals? Bronx history buﬀs and others would argue that the media was
complicit. This also begs the question of which came ﬁrst—the ﬁres or the abandonment? Or was it a combination of the two?
Steven V. Roberts, writing in the New York Times in the summer of 1966 after
John Lindsay was elected, reports the following:
In the last decade Negroes and Puerto Ricans have gradually moved north and west from the ghettos of the South Bronx and
Morrisania, looking for better housing in the narrow, well-kept avenues
parallel to the Concourse. A recent study by a social service agency predicted that the area, 98% white in 1950, would be less than 50% white
in 1975. The ﬂight of the white middle class, almost imperceptible for
years, has started to pick up. The slow exodus that opened good apartments to minority families has been accelerated by their presence. In
certain spots a familiar pattern has begun to recur. Buildings managers
have grown careless about maintenance. City services—police protection, sanitation, and recreational facilities—have grown less reliable
(28).
Another excellent example is “City Disease,” an editorial written by Stewart
Alsop for Newsweek magazine in February 1972, six years after the Roberts story.
The date is important, as much of the South Bronx was still standing; however,
many apartment buildings were abandoned which caused the fall, like dominoes,
of other buildings in the same neighborhoods. Roger Starr served as Alsop’s Bronx
tour guide and one building in particular on Washington Avenue made Alsop’s
point succinctly: “there is no mystery about what happened to 1176 Washington
Avenue. The black people who lived there were terrorized by heroin addicts in need
of a ﬁx. When life became unlivable, they escaped, and there were none to replace
them. The owner of the building abandoned it”(96). The thread of racism is barely
hidden: a building so bad even black people can’t live there and implying that building abandonment came before the ﬁres.
Alsop expands on junkies who moved in and stripped the building of anything valuable, and then set ﬁre to the structure. Later he compares the Bronx to
an unlivable desert where city and federal “slumlords” own the buildings abandoned by private owners as the neighborhood deteriorates further into an urban
cesspool. Alsop claims this process is killing our great cities. “The disease spreads
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out inexorably from the black slums to the downtown areas, and even threatens the
close-in suburbs. Can the disease be halted”(96)?
This echoes the Wallace’s point about contagious diseases spreading out from
inner city areas to white suburbs. The dramatic tone of the article also plays on any
Newsweek readers’ fears of “dark” inner city neighborhoods populated by drug addicts and black and brown people. These and many other media portrayals set the
tone for the “new” public image of Bronx neighborhoods juxtaposed against the
Grand Concourse itself, once a sought-after address considered the Park Avenue of
the Bronx.
I was so surprised to read Alsop’s editorial written well before the wave of ﬁres
reduced many South Bronx streets to rubble and the destruction became known
worldwide that I asked lifelong Bronxite and scholar Sam Goodman, who grew up
in the Mt. Eden area of the Concourse, to read the Alsop piece and give me his reaction. Goodman is currently an urban planner with the Bronx Borough President’s
Oﬃce and lives on the lower Grand Concourse:
This article reminds me of the hundreds of similar writings. The
material impresses me on two counts. First it appears to blame drug
addicts for much of the problem, failing to note that these people were
placed into the Bronx by the city itself and then abandoned, allowing
them to shoot anyone with any resources in order to shoot up. Second,
Roger Starr is the person who actually advocated for policies that today we consider the prime cause for the very conditions outlined by
the author. Hindsight is always 20-20, still it’s interesting to note that
much of the Bronx was still intact in 1972. It would be at least another
ﬁve years before things really worsened and another ten years for the
borough’s population to drop by 303,000 residents. You might say that
like so many previously printed articles, the intent of the writer was to
encourage the destruction by often referring to the Grand Concourse as
being threatened, without suggesting that anything was being tried to
stem the process. Of course, we know nothing was. (Goodman).
Based on the writings of Roger Starr, Stewart Alsop and other journalists
as well as evidence presented in A Plague on Your Houses and The Fires readers can
infer—but not guarantee—that this thinking, planning and media reporting led to
the municipally approved destruction of the South Bronx; the many pieces of the
jigsaw puzzle came together to create urban chaos. While this information must be
considered in the context of what was happening in the entire city and nation at the
time, no other urban area was as devastated as the South Bronx. While many external factors were also at work during this urban swirl, John Lindsay was the man in
charge. With that in mind, the role of the RAND Corporation and the manner in
which its data were interpreted and used by Fire Commissioner John O’Hagan with
the mayor’s approval cannot be underestimated. John Lindsay had hoped crunching
the numbers and computer modeling would help him get a stronghold over the City
of New York but those hopes were lost on the streets of the South Bronx.
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